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Abstract. With the advent of the IoT, proximity sensor devices are
installed in many places in smart cities. Without any regulation or so-
cial policy, they could lead to a super-surveillance network managed by
multi-agent systems in the future. Such networks may be able to reduce
accidents, risks, damage and errors. However, they also pose high risk
of surveillance and data breaches, including hacking attacks or malware
intrusion. This research project is aimed at investigating the implications
of IoT-driven surveillance in smart cities from privacy, data protection
and ethical perspectives. The identification of the critical issues related
to the extensive deployment of such sensing devices in the urban area
will constitute a starting point for the development of a new regulatory
framework for sensor-based surveillance in European Smart Cities. This
new regulatory system shall be aimed at providing citizens with effective
tools to exercise their rights to privacy and data protection when fac-
ing IoT-driven surveillance. Indeed, setting a clear set of rules governing
big urban data processing shall be considered crucial to ensure a fair,
democratic, human-centric development of smart cities in Europe.
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Privacy · Data Protection · Big Urban Data
1 State of the Art
Research literature has not yet provided a universally agreed definition of the
term “smart cities”, despite its ever-growing popularity in public discourse. Gen-
erally speaking, this expression conveys the fuzzy idea of the “city of the future”,
characterised by the widespread digitization of services. While many scholars and
stakeholders have focused on the conceptualization of the notion of smart cities
[1], others preferred to give up on the challenge of defining what a smart city
precisely is. For instance, researchers from the Vienna University of Technology
? Copyright c©2020 for this paper by its authors. Use permitted under Creative Com-
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suggested a totally different approach, indicating that smart cities could simply
be identified by referring to six key features: smart economy, smart mobility,
smart environment, smart people, smart living, smart governance [11].
With the advent of the Internet of Things (IoT) [9], smart cities infrastructure
is increasingly embedded with proximity sensors and actuator nodes capturing
a plethora of real-time data on people, places and activities [16]. Urban data is
also generated by mobile IoT devices, such as smartphones, or provided volun-
tarily by citizens by means of crowdsourcing apps. Although fundamental for
acquiring a comprehensive and integrated view of the urban agenda [17], such
ubiquitous surveillance systems can have worrisome implications for the rights
to privacy and data protection of urban dwellers [5, 6, 18].
First of all, the identification of a legal basis legitimizing personal data pro-
cessing still appears to be problematic in IoT environments, especially when data
collection is based on consent [6, 26]. Indeed, consent-based gathering of IoT data
poses a two-fold risk: on the one hand, people may not always know where or
when data generated by their IoT devices will be gathered by smart city sensors;
on the other, many users may wish not to be monitored, but they often lack the
tools or any real alternative to actually escape IoT-driven surveillance [29].
Furthermore, systematic repurposing of big urban data significantly under-
mines citizens’ possibilities to exercise an effective control on the information
concerning them. Firstly, data generated within the city infrastructure is very
likely to be combined with data stored in private companies’ databases and
processed with the use of big data technologies [6]. The criteria governing the al-
gorithmic processing of big data are often lacking in transparency and may lead
to discriminatory results [3, 13, 23]. When dealing with smart cities, these issues
are likely to be magnified as the results of automated processing of urban data
are employed systematically in public authorities’ decision-making processes.
From a criminal justice perspective, for instance, sensor-based collection of
data is likely to considerably affect the activities of law enforcement agencies
operating in the urban area. Smart data trails may be employed either in pre-
dictive policing programs, or in the framework of ongoing criminal proceedings.
In these cases, repurposing of big urban data needs to be grounded on a solid
legal basis, as required by the European human rights framework on privacy
and data protection1. Nonetheless, the growing convergence of private and pub-
lic databases [8] significantly complicates the identification of the legal regime
1 Cf. Articles 7, 8, and 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union (hereinafter: CFREU) and Article 8 of the European Convention of Human
Rights (hereinafter: ECHR). Moreover, it should be noted that in its leading case
Digital Rights Ireland, the European Court of Justice (hereinafter: ECJ) has consid-
ered law enforcement’s access and re-use of metadata on communications as consti-
tuting an interference on the rights enshrined at Articles 7 and 8 of the CFREU, cf.
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laying down the exact conditions for law enforcement’s access of users’ personal
data. In fact, the legal requirements for repurposing collected IoT data may vary
depending on the public or private nature of the database in which such data
has been stored. In the former case, smart data may be lawfully re-used for law
enforcement purposes without any prior authorisation, pursuant to the general
principle of re-use of documents held by public sector bodies2. In the latter, on
the contrary, law enforcement officers shall obtain ex ante authorisation from an
independent body in order to access data gathered by private companies3.
In the context of smart cities, the expanding privatisation of infrastructure
implies that venues traditionally considered as public (e.g. town squares, roads)
are now laden with privately operated sensors. Likewise, services such as pub-
lic transportation, policing, management of utilities and public health systems
are extensively delegated to private companies on the grounds of public-private
partnerships (hereinafter: PPP or P3). In these situations, it may not always
be easy to know if sensor data will be stored directly in public databases, or
in those held by the private companies delivering the service [19]. Any lack of
clearness on the legal framework applicable to IoT data collected in smart cities
is thus likely to benefit disproportionally the activities of law enforcement agen-
cies, which may easily get access to citizens’ data by circumventing privacy and
data protection safeguards.
Legal issues related to the processing of smart data go largely beyond the
field of (algorithmic) criminal justice. Thanks to big data analytics, troves of
personal data gleaned from different small sensors in the urban area can now re-
veal powerful inferences about citizens and consumers, which could occasionally
result in denial of insurance, discrimination in recruitment procedures or in price
policies [25]. When dealing with smart cities, economic sorting of the population
can also lead to unfair practices in the management of public services, which
may be partially or poorly delivered in disadvantaged neighbourhoods [29]. In
this respect, it should be noted that the policies drawing on the algorithmic pro-
cessing of smart data not only give rise to discrimination issues, but also put into
question the accountability of public authorities, as well as citizens’ possibility
of exercising a democratic control over historic State functions [27].
IoT data collected by smart city sensors will be probably outsourced to the
cloud. In this case, automated software is likely to copy the data and re-direct it
to other data centres – possibly falling under a different jurisdiction – in order
to spare resources and boost performance rates. In practice, however, such pro-
ECJ, 8 April 2014, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd, joint cases C-293/12 and C-594/12,
§35.
2 Article 3 of the Directive 2019/1024/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council, of 20 June 2019, on on open data and the re-use of public sector information
(recast) (Official Journal L 172, 26/06/2019 pp. 56 – 83).
3 Cf. ECJ, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd, cit., §62.
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cessing operations are hardly transparent and raise important privacy concerns,
as data is very likely to be outsourced to countries having lower data protection
standards [7]. Moreover, when access to stored IoT data is required by foreign
law enforcement authorities, cross-border cooperation between States may be
necessary [14].
2 Research questions
This research project aims to tackle the following research questions and sub-
questions:
1. How can citizens effectively exercise their rights to privacy and data pro-
tection in the context of smart cities IoT-driven surveillance?
– Is the traditional notion of individual privacy apt to tackle the challenges of
big urban data processing?
– When required, how can end users provide for meaningful consent to data
processing operations in IoT urban environments?
– Which conditions should govern law enforcement agencies’ access and use of
publicly and privately stored IoT urban data?
– What kind of remedies should be available to smart cities citizens against
fully automated processing of big urban data performed by public authori-
ties?
– Which mechanisms can ensure smart cities public bodies’ accountability for
privacy and data protection violations?
– Which are the implications of smart cities open data initiatives for citizens’
rights to privacy and data protection?
– Which principles should govern a privacy-oriented implementation of the
smart city infrastructure?
– Which technological solutions can safeguard data sovereignty for cloud-stored
IoT urban data?
2. Can individuals claim to have a reasonable expectation of privacy in smart
cities IoT public environments?
– Is the traditional distinction between private and public places still viable
in the context of IoT urban environments?
– Can the distinction between private and public places still be considered as
a proxy to distinguish major and minor private life intrusions in smart cities
IoT environments?
– From a criminal justice perspective, which procedural safeguards should be
granted to individuals against investigatory acts performed on IoT devices
by law enforcement officers in public places?
Surveillance Risks in IoT Applied to Smart Cities
3 Objectives
The first research question aims to identify privacy, data protection and security
issues arising from the systematic deployment of sensor-driven surveillance in
smart cities. In this respect, a particular attention will be dedicated to the con-
ditions enabling smart cities dwellers to give meaningful consent to the collection
of their personal data in IoT public environments. The creation of a trust-based
relationship between citizens and smart cities public bodies heavily relies on the
development of a clear, organic set of rules governing the collection and process-
ing of sensor data in the particular context of smart cities. That is why the final
objective of this research project will be the proposition of a specific regulatory
framework for sensorveillance (i.e. sensor-based surveillance) in European Smart
Cities. Such new legal framework shall be inspired to the following guidelines:
– In its scope, it shall be applicable indiscriminately to public and private
entities participating to the management of the smart city;
– It shall aim at overcoming traditional privacy legal tools inapt to tackle the
new reality of sensor fusion [15] in smart cities;
– It shall draw on the systematic implementation of the principles of privacy
by design4 and data protection impact assessments5 in the design of smart
cities infrastructure;
– From a criminal justice perspective, it shall provide for homogeneous safe-
guards for access and re-use of IoT-generated data, regardless of the private
or public nature of the storing database;
– It shall provide for effective remedies against the dangers of fully automated
processing of big urban data, thus enabling citizens to exercise a control over
the decisions of smart cities public bodies.
As a starting point, we have acknowledged that the current EU data pro-
tection framework remains unclear on which legal ground may lawfully serve as
viable basis for data processing operations in smart urban environments. In these
instances, anchoring data collection to users’ consent may be problematic, as city
authorities may have a legitimate interest in not revealing the exact positioning
of the sensors embedded in the infrastructure (e.g. for security reasons, or due to
potential re-use of sensor data in the law enforcement sector). Also, urban data
collection may not be grounded on a legitimate interest of the data controller6,
since this particular legal basis is not applicable to data collection performed
by public authorities. On the other hand, the wording of art. 5(3) the Direc-
4 Article 25 of the Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing
Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation, GDPR) (Official Journal
L 119, 4.5.2016, pp. 1 – 88).
5 Article 35 of the GDPR.
6 Art. 6(1)(f) of the GDPR.
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tive 2002/58/EC7 – which constitutes a lex specialis in relation to the GDPR
– appears to be too obsolete to include in its scope the wide variety of sensors
embedded in smart city infrastructure [6]. Arguably, the approval of the new
e-Privacy regulation will further change the legal landscape for data processing
operations in IoT environments. Against this background, this research project
will aim at identifying the legal grounds that – nowadays or in the foreseeable
future – may provide for practicable solutions to legitimise data processing in
smart urban environments.
Furthermore, this project will seek to address the issues stemming from the
growing re-use of publicly and privately-held data in the law enforcement con-
text. Our analysis will follow the guidelines of the recent European strategy for
data8, which submits data transfers from the private sector to law enforcement
agencies to general privacy and data protection norms (i.e. prior authorisation by
a judge or other independent authority). On the other hand, when re-purposed
data was initially stored by other public bodies, the Open Data Directive ap-
plies. In this case, however, access to data may be granted to law enforcement
only when necessary and proportionate. Taking all of this into consideration, the
prospective regulatory framework will lay out appropriate rules to align, as much
as possible, data protection safeguards surrounding law enforcement’s access of
both privately and publicly-held data.
The prospective regulatory framework will seek to provide the best practices
and mechanisms that can ensure the accountability of public authorities relying
on algorithmic processing of big urban data. Accountability of public authorities
should be fostered in three key moments. Firstly, we will focus on the ex ante
approaches which may facilitate a prospective legal review of the decisions taken
by automated systems operating in the city. When feasible, proposed solutions
may involve transparency in technological processes and services (e.g. in the case
of open technologies and software). Secondly, we will centre our analysis on ex
post remedies which shall be made available to citizens against fully automated
processing of their personal data carried out by public authorities. Thirdly, on
a more general level, we will advocate the establishment of an audit commis-
sion which shall periodically review the performance of automated systems that
are at the core of the smart projects implemented throughout the city. Due to
the wide variety of the issues concerned, this regulatory body should be mul-
tidisciplinary in its composition, involving ethicists, legal experts, political and
7 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002
concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the elec-
tronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications)
Official Journal L 201, 31.7.2002, p. 37–47.
8 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, 19th
Feb. 2020, A European Strategy for data, COM(2020)66.
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citizens’ representatives, technicians.
A new regulatory framework for sensorveillance in European Smart Cities
should also be anchored to a thorough rethinking of the historic distinction
between private dwellings and public venues [21]. To this purpose, the second
research question aims at investigating the possibility of creating a new legal
categorisation for private-public (IoT) places in smart cities. The theorisation
of a new legal framework for smart cities IoT environments shall be focused on
the parameter of the reasonable expectation of privacy of urban dwellers, rather
than on the public or private nature of the venue in question.
4 Methodology
In order to attain the proposed objectives, this research will combine an inter-
disciplinary [2] and a comparative approach.
First of all, we will rely on scholarly writings of different academic fields,
e.g. ICT law, privacy and data protection law, criminal law, urban studies and
surveillance studies. We will also embrace the traditional doctrinal legal method,
by carrying out an integrated legal analysis of the EU privacy and data protec-
tion legislation, as well as of different regulatory instruments adopted by certain
European smart cities (e.g. Barcelona). The review of the current positive law
will be combined with an in-depth analysis of the European Court of Justice
(ECJ) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)’s case law relevant
for the fields of privacy and data protection. Throughout the lead-time of im-
plementation of this project, a particular attention will be dedicated to the
latest technological advancements offering the best privacy-enhancing solutions
for IoT environments in smart cities. As highlighted by Gasser, contemporary
approaches to privacy law need to rethink the role of technology, which should
be no longer regarded as a threat to privacy, “but as a part of the solution space”
[10].
When re-defining the framework for private and public places in smart cities,
we will also draw on a comparative approach, taking into consideration the case-
law of United States judicial bodies (in particular of the United States Supreme
Court, USSC) and European supranational Courts, i.e. the European Court of
Human Rights (ECtHR) and the ECJ. Indeed, the casuistic, empirical approach
adopted by these courts is suitable to deal with the ever-changing legal issues
emerging from the deployment of new surveillance technologies [28]. In particu-
lar, the USSC case-law concerning the scope of Fourth Amendment safeguards
in the contemporary technological framework may be useful in analysing the
concepts of consent and expectation of privacy in IoT environments9 [12]. From
9 Carpenter v. United States, U.S., No. 16-402 (2017).
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a European perspective, we will investigate if the current state of the ECtHR’s
case-law provides for the need of a reasonable expectation of privacy even in
smart cities public places10.
From an evaluative standpoint, this research will adopt an abductive, case-
based approach in assessing whether current smart cities policies and European
legal standards are apt to the task of upholding privacy and data protection
standards in IoT environments. On the one hand, the analysis of existing public
policies in European and American smart cities will mainly rely on empirical
qualitative research methods [4]. On the other, the review of the EU privacy and
data protection framework will be primarily focused on the issues arising from
the contextual and relational nature of algorithmic data processing techniques
employed in big urban data environments. Because the importance of contexts
has been highly stressed in privacy literature [24], we should thoroughly examine
the features and dynamics of the urban settings where IoT surveillance practices
take place.
Subsequently, the normative framework that will inspire the development of
a regulatory system for sensorveillance in smart cities will take into account the
criterion of proportionality – pivotal in European teleological legality [22] – as
well as the ethical values of equality, security, social justice and trust between
citizens, smart cities public authorities and IoT technologies deployed in the ur-
ban scenario. Those principles shall indeed be considered crucial in ensuring an
anthropocentric development of the peculiar social setting of smart cities. On the
whole, our normative approach will be grounded on the acknowledgment that
the implementation of IoT solutions is deeply rooted in current policies for urban
development, and it is only likely to be fostered in the future [20]. Therefore,
our normative solutions shall focus on coherent, fair and humane approaches to
emerging legal and ethical issues, without aiming at banning ground-breaking
technologies that may contribute to the resilience and sustainability of the smart
cities of the future.
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